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Explaining, Assessing, and  
Changing High Consumption  
 
HARRY VAN DER LINDEN 
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These writings reflect the renewed interest in the 1990s of scholars and the 
public in questioning the consumer society, an interest that the political crises 
engendered by 9/11 have overshadowed but not eliminated. In The Overspent 
American, Schor explains the emergence of strong doubts about high 
consumption by arguing that a “new consumerism” of escalating desires has 
evolved that is increasingly costly to the American high consumers 
themselves. In Do Americans Shop Too Much?, she synoptically restates her 
view and responds to nine included critical essays. Segal, in Graceful 
Simplicity, articulates the virtues of simple living and argues that the main 
obstacle to its realization in high-income societies is the growing expense of 
satisfying core needs. Confronting Consumption (CC), an anthology of fourteen 
papers, discusses the negative impact of consumption on the environment and 
contests the prevailing paradigm that environmental degradation is primarily 
a matter of production and population. Ethics of Consumption (EC) covers the 
prior topics and also raises the issue of how high consumption in the North 
affects the global poor. The collection contains twenty-seven essays and is the 
culmination of an interdisciplinary project on consumption undertaken by the 
Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland.  
 
 
High Consumption as Status Consumption  
 
In The Overspent American, Schor argues that the “old consumerism” prior to 
the 1970s involved neighbors setting the standard of satisfactory spending 
and, since neighbors usually have roughly similar incomes, there was no great 
pressure to continuously increase spending. What characterizes the “new 
consumerism” (coming to its own in the 1980s and beyond) is that many 
people have come to identify themselves with individuals who have much 
higher incomes, even in the order of five times as much, and seek to emulate 
their lifestyles. The harms of this new status or positional consumption are 
intense spending pressure, growing material dissatisfaction, less savings, 
greater debts, more personal bankruptcies, less preparedness to pay taxes for 
public goods, longer working hours, and more two-income families with a 
time squeeze.  
 
Schor convincingly shows that positional consumption no longer has 
neighbors as a main reference point, but she offers little evidence for her 
claim that “by 1991 almost everybody was gazing at the top of the [income] 
pyramid” (13). In a survey she conducted about the spending and savings 
choices of middle-class employees at a large telecommunications company 
(Telecom), only about 2% of the respondents mentioned neighbors as a 
reference group, while around 40% mentioned friends or relatives and about 
30% referred to coworkers or people with the same occupation (74). Such 
reference groups, however, tend to have members with comparatively modest 
income variations. Schor disagrees, claiming that “extremely high earners 
[have] emerged within occupation after occupation” and have become “a 
visible, and very elevated, point of comparison” for the others (10). Her 
Telecom survey does not really support her observation. About 60% of the 
respondents say that their financial status is the same as that of their 
reference group and only about 3% say it is much better or much worse (201).  
 
This does not invalidate Schor’s view that middle-class Americans are 
engaged in status spending. Her Telecom study shows that consumers who 
view their financial status as below that of their chosen real-life reference 
group save significantly less than those who perceive their status to be the 
same (76). She also did a survey of cosmetics purchases, showing that the 
more a cosmetic is visible to other women in the process of application, the 
more is paid for the product irrespective of quality considerations (48-54). 
What is debatable, though, is whether Schor is right that during the past few 
decades the consumption aspirations of most middle-class Americans have 
rapidly grown in reach and intensity. The shift away from neighbors as a 
reference group does not warrant her claim. She also maintains that 
television—not just advertising but regular programming—creates upscale 
desires. How-ever, this can hardly be a major factor because the media have 
always projected lifestyles unobtainable for most Americans. In Do Americans 
Shop Too Much?, Schor adds that the growing economic inequality since the 
1970s has contributed to the new consumerism (9). The huge gain in income 
and wealth of the upper-middle class led to a true spending boom visible to all 
and influencing almost everyone’s conception of satisfactory spending. No 
doubt, Schor has a point here, but the growing economic inequality offers 
another explanation for the harms that she associates with the new 
consumerism. The globalization of the economy has led to greater job 
uncertainty and stagnant or even dropping wages for the majority of 
Americans since the early 1970s. At the same time, the costs of satisfying 
some basic needs, such as the need for decent housing, have risen in real 
terms, partly due to spending patterns of the upper-middle class. These 
increased costs have offset much of the increased two-parent household 
income from women joining the labor force. Thus we need to assume only a 
gradual growth of the consumption expectations of most Americans in order 
to explain their growing material dissatisfaction, overworked families, 
increased debts, and so on.  
 
High Consumption as Need Satisfaction  
 
This argument finds support in chapter three of Segal’s Graceful Simplicity 
(which appeared earlier in EC). He identifies seven core needs—housing, 
clothing, food, transportation, health care, education, and protection against 
loss of income—and argues that the total income necessary to satisfy the core 
needs, i.e., the total “need-required income” (NRI), has risen in real terms in 
the United States over the past few decades. The NRI for housing has in-
creased, in some parts of the country outstripping even the real growth of 
median two-parent family income. The NRI for transportation has 
significantly increased with the emergence of the two-income family in need 
of two or more cars. Food and clothing costs have remained more or less 
steady, which means that people spent a smaller percentage of their income 
on these items. Health care costs have not (yet) increased much as a 
percentage of total income because government and business have carried 
most of the huge per capita increase. However, the need is unmet for many 
Americans. The NRI for education has greatly increased in the areas of day 
care and pre-school and the need for these services is often not adequately 
met. The NRI for protection against loss of income has grown in recent years 
due to decreased job security, longer life span, and greater uncertainty about 
the viability of Social Security. Again, the need is often not met. Segal 
concludes: “For most Americans their subjective experience—that they 
always need more money than they have—is not to be explained by inflation 
in their appetites . . . but, rather, by socioeconomic conditions that have 
resulted in unmet need or in increased cost of meeting long-existing needs. 
This is true of housing, transportation, education, and income security” (65-
66).  
 
Segal’s analysis offers an important corrective of Schor’s view. However, 
where she may be faulted for overstating the escalation of consumption 
expectations, he may be faulted for understating them. Segal grants that there 
is some escalation of desires (43), but fails to see that part of what he de-
scribes as NRI increases in various areas is due to rising consumption 
expectations among most middle-class Americans and thus the real NRI 
increases are in fact smaller than he portrays them to be. Consider 
transportation. Most two-job families may have little choice in buying two 
cars, but, certainly, they can opt for a basic economy model or a gas-guzzler 
with numerous options. Segal notes that about 20% of the median income 
growth for two-parent households between 1960 and 1990 went to increased 
transportation costs (56), failing to note that the NRI increase for 
transportation would have been smaller if Americans had not opted for 
gadgets and powerful engines. The same is true of the NRI for housing, and the 
decline of the percentage of total income spent on clothing would have been 
even greater without raised expectations.  
 
In Do Americans Shop Too Much?, the critics of Schor offer additional accounts 
of what motivates contemporary high spending. Douglas Holt argues, for 
example, that we live in a “postmodern market” where people are engaged in 
“an open-ended project of self-creation,” a process that leads one “to play with 
different identities by consuming the goods and services associated with those 
identities” (65). In similar vein, Colin Campbell rejects in EC that con-
temporary consumption is positional or need-driven; rather, the modern 
consumer is a daydreamer, expecting that the purchase of goods will bring 
associated pleasures anticipated in the imagination. These alternative 
accounts raise interesting questions, such as whether spending motivations 
might not vary with age group. Schor discusses social explanations for 
increased spending other than status seeking, such as competency signaling. 
All these explanations may be needed to complete the picture, but, unlike 
increased NRI and the desire to sustain at least middle class status, none of 
them seems to go very far in explaining why people remain on the spending 
treadmill even when it starts to hurt.  
 
The Functioning/Capabilities Standard of Good Consumption  
 
Schor and most EC contributors evaluate high spending on basis of commonly 
accepted values or standards, such as individual happiness and self-respect. A 
few EC contributors develop standards rooted in their religious tradition. 
Eliezer Diamond offers a Jewish view of consumption, Charles Wilber a Roman 
Catholic consumption ethic, and James Nash argues that frugality—“an old 
and honored virtue, once near the heart of Christian ethics” (416)—is a 
subversive virtue for the affluent society. A final group of essays seeks to 
arrive at a more philosophically explicated standard of judging consumption 
on the basis of a functioning/capabilities interpretation of human well-being.  
 
In “The Good As Discipline, the Good As Freedom,” Martha Nussbaum 
recapitulates her familiar view that there are ten “central human functional 
capabilities,” such as the ability to imagine, use practical reason, affiliate with 
others, relate to nature, and have good health, adequate food, and shelter. 
What is new is that she emphasizes that since the good life requires only the 
possession of all capabilities, not their active employment, it would be a grave 
mistake of a government to force people toward using specific abilities: 
“Capability, not functioning, is our political goal” (321). The mistake is made 
by illiberal Aristotelians who view “the good as discipline.” Nussbaum 
continues to articulate on the basis of many interesting examples how this 
wrong conception differs from her own view of “the good as freedom,” but, 
surprisingly, very few of the examples directly concern consumption.  
 
Without contesting Nussbaum’s political point, David Crocker argues that 
human flourishing requires that all capabilities be realized in some balance. In 
“Living at a High Economic Standard: A Functionings Analysis,” Segal accepts 
the drift of this modification and adds that Nussbaum’s account of human 
capabilities is not specific enough to articulate the notion of good 
consumption. His main concern, however, is to clarify what the relationship is 
between income growth and increases in standard of living. On his ac-count, a 
high standard of living requires ten actual “core functionings,” consisting of 
having meaningful work, enjoying ample time for amusement and company, 
living in a pleasant environment, and “core functionings” in the areas of the 
seven core needs (outlined above). He concludes that “with respect to 
functionings such as devotes ample time to enjoyment of friends or gets 
around relatively quickly among the central foci of everyday life or hosts with 
pride in a dwelling a reasonable distance from work or lives free from anxiety 
over the decline or loss of income or lives in an aesthetically rich human and 
natural environment, a case can be made that economic growth has lowered 
rather than raised these dimensions of standard of living” (361-62). This is an 
important claim and suggests that an explication of human flourishing can 
offer a powerful standard of assessing consumption. It should be emphasized, 
though, that the issue is not just economic growth, but economic growth in 
global corporate capitalism and that there are great differences across classes 
in how growth has adversely affected (or improved) good functionings. In 
Graceful Simplicity, Segal further explores a high standard of living as graceful 
living, stating that it combines material modesty with inner peace, generosity, 
and appreciation for others and the world. The exploration is insightful but 
does not add much to the critical importance of his ten core functionings 
approach.  
 
High Consumption and the Poor  
 
All the books pay remarkably little attention to how upscale spending by the 
upper classes specifically affects the desires of the poor in high consumption 
societies and increases their NRI in areas such as housing, transportation, and 
health care. In “Distancing of Waste: Overconsumption in a Global Economy,” 
Jennifer Clapp discusses how the growing waste of producing and discarding 
consumer goods is distanced from those who mostly enjoy the goods and ends 
up in poor neighborhoods and minority communities (CC, 164). Her main 
focus, however, is global distancing and how international efforts to curtail 
this practice have had limited success. Her paper supports Thomas Pogge’s 
argument in “A Global Resources Dividend” that high consumers in the North 
are “negatively responsible” for the “radical poverty” in the developing world. 
They consume and trade so that the global status quo—brought about by a 
“shared and bloody history” (EC, 509)—is maintained, while alternative global 
institutional arrangements are possible that would lessen the poverty. 
Moreover, the rich fail to compensate the global poor for their 
disproportionate consumption of the earth’s limited resources. Pogge states 
that the global poor “cannot secure anything like a proportionate share of the 
world’s natural resources [but] they do get their proportionate share of the 
burdens resulting from the degradation of our natural environment” (508).  
 
Allen Hammond’s essay in EC comparing resource consumption in the North 
and the South supports Pogge’s analysis. The same is true of Richard Tucker’s 
essay (in CC) about the U.S. market for tropical products, concluding that “the 
cost of . . . prosperity, however far removed from the ultimate consumer, has 
been damage and reduction of tropical Nature’s bounty” (195). Pogge offers 
his “global resources dividend” (GRD) as a “realistic” and “practicable” 
proposal for how the affluent can discharge their responsibility for radical 
poverty (511). The GRD is a dividend to be paid for the extraction of limited 
resources, such as oil, gas, coal, and various minerals, but may also be 
imposed on resources that become “eroded” by industry and agriculture, such 
as air and water (511). A modest GRD would generate as much as the total 
income of the poorest quintile of the world’s population and is to be 
distributed via some international collection agency to the poorest nations in 
pro-portion to their populations and for the sake of their economic 
development. When poor nations have corrupt governments the GRD is to be 
allocated directly to the local poor or to development agencies that represent 
their interests (515).  
 
Pogge compares his GRD to the better known “Tobin tax,” which is a tax on 
international currency transactions. He grants that the Tobin tax might be 
easier to collect and be more acceptable to rich countries, but he rightly notes 
that “the Tobin tax has no environmental payoff and also lacks a moral 
rationale connecting payers and recipients” (517). The environmental payoff 
of the GRD is that it encourages efficient use of resources. This points, 
however, to a problem: The GRD inflicts a disproportional burden on 
countries with a high and inefficient energy use and a GNP that is a bit too 
high to warrant receiving GRD funds. More broadly, Pogge should explore how 
his GRD would affect rapidly industrializing nations.  
 
Resource Scarcity  
 
Herman Daly argues in EC that population growth in the South and 
consumption in the North will lead to resource scarcity. Mark Sagoff replies in 
“Carrying Capacity and Ecological Economics,” claiming that Daly and other 
ecological economists “are unable to point to a single scarcity of natural 
capital that knowledge and ingenuity are unlikely to alleviate” (EC, 45). Sagoff 
concludes that environmentalists should move away from defending the 
preservation of the natural world on economic grounds and adopt instead the 
approach that nature has great intrinsic value. He writes: “Economic growth 
may not be morally desirable even if it is ecologically sustainable” (46).  
 
Sagoff is a technological optimist, holding that technological progress will 
always lead to more known and recoverable reserves of nonrenewable 
resources as well as to substitutes for resources that have become quite 
expensive due to greater scarcity. Dematerialization of production is another 
reason for holding that resource scarcity will not impede increased 
consumption and economic growth (30ff). Sagoff further claims that tree 
plantations and aqua-culture will take care of nature’s limit with regard to 
replacing fish and forests (35-36). The editors of CC convincingly challenge 
this optimism, noting that even huge increases in estimated supply quickly 
disappear once we assume a continuous 5% increase in consumption (9-11). 
On their account, high consumption is a greater problem than population 
growth as such (and, of course, it is their combination that may in the long run 
place much stress on the environment). They also note that consumption may 
actually increase as a result of greater technological efficiency. In sum, the 
narrow focus on production (and even population) and the failure to question 
consumption may actually worsen the problem of resource scarcity. A further 
difficulty with Sagoff’s analysis is that the social and political dimensions of 
scarcity are neglected. Increased oil consumption, for example, will continue 
to create serious political problems in light of the geographical location of 
most proven oil reserves, while not all countries will be equally able to bear 
the huge costs of moving toward alternative energy sources.  
 
Paul Waggoner and Robert Goodland offer conflicting views in EC of how 
agriculture can come to feed a population of 10 billion within the nearby 
future. Waggoner argues that since “nature’s salvation lies . . . in humanity 
having land to spare,” crop yields must double in the years ahead (71). He 
provides few details of how this might be accomplished, but his proposal 
seems one of genetic engineering, new pesticides, more use of fertilizer, and 
the like. Goodland contests the viability of this strategy of greater intensifica-
tion, and proposes instead that high consumers, also for the sake of their own 
health, eat “lower down the food chain,” ending the situation that almost 50% 
of global grains are fed to livestock (101).  
Waggoner offers what Jack Manno in CC calls a solution with a “high 
commodity potential,” while Goodland’s proposal is much lower on the 
commodity potentiality scale. Activities high on the commodity scale require 
many marketable products or commodities, while activities with low com-
modity potential offer few opportunities for the selling and buying of goods. 
Walking, for example, has low commodity potential; public transportation 
offers medium commodity potential; and personal cars have high commodity 
potential (CC, 74). Manno defines commoditization as “the tendency to 
preferentially develop things most suited to function as commodities . . . as the 
answer to each and every type of human want and need” (70). Industrial 
capitalist societies are geared toward commoditization or turning all human 
activities into high commodity endeavors. The result is that at present 
“improved consumption efficiency—a rise in social and individual welfare 
with lower energy and material consumption—is increasingly difficult to 
achieve” (73). And the environmental price paid is that approaches are 
favored in agriculture, transportation, energy use, and, ironically, even in the 
area of environmental protection itself, that cause environmental degradation 
and scarcity (83ff). As an alternative to high commodity potential agriculture, 
Manno argues for a lower commodity, labor-intensive, diversified, organic 
agriculture, offering a critical alternative to Waggoner’s mainstream view.  
 
Changing High Consumption  
 
All the consumption studies here make a strong case for reducing and re-
directing high consumption. Current economic growth in high-consumption 
societies blocks graceful living, leaves citizens overspent and overworked, and 
burdens the natural world. Robert Lane adds that high-consumption societies 
have greater rates of depression due the penetration of the market within 
social relations (EC, 223ff). Pogge and some other contributors to EC show 
that high consumption is implicated in global poverty and exploitation, even 
though, surprisingly, none of the authors offers a detailed discussion of 
sweatshop labor in for-export-only industries across the developing world.  
 
Schor offers nine “principles” in The Overspent American for getting people off 
the “consumer escalator” (145ff). Most of these principles consist of practical 
advice as to how individual high consumers can change their life-styles: They 
should, for example, control their spending desires, buy durable goods, view 
“exclusivity” as “uncool,” avoid shopping as self-reward (“retail therapy”), 
share consumer goods, and opt for reduced working hours. Schor sees the 
Voluntary Simplicity Movement (VSM) as an indication that American adult 
high consumers are ready to take such steps. In his article, “In Search of 
Consumption Resistance: The Voluntary Simplicity Movement,” Maniates 
offers a sympathetic, yet critical, analysis of VSM, concluding that the 
movement is not elitist but is faced with the danger of being co-opted as an 
alternative commercial opportunity (“simplicity for sale”). More worrisome, 
and not unrelated, is that VSM leaves consumptive resistance mostly a matter 
of individual choice and has failed to develop and pursue a political agenda, at 
least beyond the local level (CC, 228ff).  
 
Schor recognizes the need for pursuing a political agenda on the national level, 
but it is less emphasized than one would expect on basis of the logic of her 
own argument: Reducing escalating consumption expectations requires that 
the upper-middle class (as reference group) comes to consume less and, in her 
own words, this necessitates “reversing thirty years of growing inequality in 
the distribution of income and wealth” (164). Her failure to stress the need for 
political change might have to do with the fact that The Overspent American is 
“directed to people . . . whose incomes afford a comfortable life-style” (xiv). Do 
Americans Shop Too Much? is more politically focused. Segal is more 
consistent: he rejects “individualistic strategies of simple living” on the ground 
that most consumers have in fact little play room for reducing spending as 
long as their NRI keeps on rising, and proposes a “politics of simplicity” aimed 
at reducing the NRI (87). It includes better public transportation,  
 
free higher education, more federal holidays, and a “simply living credit” to 
facilitate the option for reduced working hours for people with modest in-
comes (84-96).  
 
In “Individualization: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike, Save the World?,” Maniates is 
similarly critical of mainstream environmental groups, such the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), that claim that individuals can save the 
earth through making responsible purchases, recycling, tree planting, and, of 
course, joining organizations like the EDF. He points out that the irony of this 
individualization of responsibility and “flight from politics” is that con-
sumption as “green” consumption legitimizes consumption in general and 
with it a major cause of environmental degradation (CC, 65). Individualist 
scenarios ignore that consumer choices are limited by institutional practices. 
What further undermines the efficacy of such scenarios is that the environ-
mental impact of individual consumption choices is often obscure to those 
who make them. Ecocertification and labeling alleviates this problem, but 
their effective implementation requires political struggle (see Fred Gale, 
“Caveat Certificatum: The Case of Forest Certification,” in CC).  
 
Most of the authors discussed here do not seem to appreciate fully how 
difficult it might be to actually change high consumption. Consider again 
Manno’s essay on “commoditization.” He distinguishes between three 
approaches to taking care of human needs—individual purchase of 
commodities, need prevention and reduction, and collective approaches to 
need satisfaction—and argues that “a healthy, balanced economy would be 
able to steadily improve and develop all three approaches” (CC, 69). Collective 
approaches include such practices as sharing resources, public transportation, 
and communal entertainment, while need reduction and prevention include 
such measures as shortening the distance between home and work, health 
promotions, and eliminating excessive ways of satisfying basic needs. Schor, 
Segal, and all the other high consumption critics here argue for expanding one 
or both of these two approaches, but, as Manno notes, in capitalist society, due 
its very nature, the road taken is primarily one of expanding personal 
consumption; it is the road with the highest commodity potential. So, mini-
mally, the challenge of changing high consumption requires the emergence of 
the political will to reverse the privatization of public services and the market 
penetration of all aspects of society. This means that democracy and political 
involvement must be much strengthened on local and national levels and 
become independent of corporate influence. This point, to the extent that it is 
at all recognized, remains understated, even in Manno’s essay. More radically, 
and beyond the horizon of the literature examined here, successful 
consumptive resistance might necessitate that alternatives to corporate 
capitalism, such as economic democracy, are articulated and realized.  
 
What adds to the challenge of the political project of changing high 
consumption is that neoliberal economic globalization has weakened political 
democracy and is pushing its agenda of unrestricted market rationality across 
the world. Here it should be noted that Pogge’s GRD, even if it would eradicate 
the worst and most devastating expressions of global poverty, basically leaves 
the question open of how sustainable, responsible, and satisfactory 
consumption can be realized for most of humanity not residing in the North. 
Global labor and environmental standards as well as global regulatory rules 
about investment, supporting local autonomy, might be steps in the right 
direction. More broadly, it is crucial that high commodity strategies cease to 
be the dominant paradigm of economic development in the South because 
they lead to growing economic inequality (within and between states) and 
might bring about serious or even devastating environmental harms. Again, 
low commodity approaches require public empowerment and the curtailment 
of global corporate dominance, if not the realization of a different economy 
altogether. These are formidable political tasks, but the recent anti-
globalization movement offers some hope that the challenge of changing high 
consumption will be eventually met. 
